Dernières décisions

The Township of Oro-Medonte (the township) received a three-part request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) about a certain water infrastructure issue. The township decided that it had reasonable grounds to consider the request as frivolous or vexatious under section 4(1)(b) of the Act. In this order, the adjudicator upholds the township’s decision, and dismisses the appeal.

Metrolinx received a six-part request under the Act for records relating to the Hurontario Light Rail Transit system. It issued a decision denying access, in full, to the records responsive to part 1 of the request, relying on section 14(1)(i) (security) of the Act . Metrolinx stated that there are no records responsive to the other parts of the request. At mediation, the issue of whether Metrolinx conducted a reasonable search for responsive records was added to the scope of the appeal. In this decision, the adjudicator upholds Metrolinx’s decision to withhold the records under section 14(1)(i). She finds, however, that Metrolinx’s search was not reasonable and orders it to conduct a further search for responsive records.

The requester made an access request to the Ministry of the Solicitor General (the ministry) under the Act for records about herself. The ministry located responsive records and disclosed them in part to the requester. The requester appealed the ministry’s decision on the basis that she believes that the ministry has not conducted a reasonable search for these records.

In this interim order, the adjudicator orders the ministry to conduct.

The Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Sport (the ministry) received a request for records related to a specified grant application. The ministry located responsive records and granted partial access to them, with portions withheld under sections 13(1) (advice or recommendations) and 19 (solicitor-client privilege).

In this order, the adjudicator finds that the withheld records are exempt from disclosure under sections 13(1) and 19 and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant made a request to the university for access to information about herself for a four-month period in 2017. The university located eight responsive records and granted partial access. The university denied access to record 1 under section 49(b) (personal privacy), and to records 7 and 8 under section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information) read with section 19 (solicitor-client privilege). In this order, the adjudicator upholds the university’s decision to deny access to records 7 and 8. The adjudicator partially upholds the university's decision to deny access to record 1 and orders the university to disclose a severed version of record 1 to the appellant by removing the personal information of another individual.

Interim Order MO-4446-I resolved two of three access requests the appellant filed under the Act to the City of Belleville (the city). The requested records related to the attendance of city staff at the appellant’s property on a specified date. In Interim Order MO-4446-I, the adjudicator ordered the city to conduct a further search for records responsive to the appellant’s request. In accordance with Interim Order MO-4446-I, the city conducted a further search and located an updated record. The appellant continued to take the position that additional records should exist. In this final order, the adjudicator finds that the city’s further search was reasonable and dismisses the appeal.

This order deals with a third party appeal of an access decision under the Act made by the Ministry of Health (the ministry). The request was for records relating to the third party’s community laboratory business, namely records relating to the development, review and implementation of external reviews and to the implementation of a specific funding cut. The ministry decided to disclose the responsive information in part. The appellant claims the application of the mandatory third-party information exemption in section 17(1) of the Act to specific commercial and/or financial information that the ministry had decided to disclose. In this order, the adjudicator finds that the appellant has not established that disclosure of the withheld information would result in any of the harms set out in section 17(1). The ministry is ordered to disclose the records to the requester in accordance with its decision.

The appellant made a request to the university for access to information about herself in relation to a specific event and meeting held on campus. The university denied access to 15 of 28 responsive records based on section 49(a) (right to refuse access to requester’s own personal information), read with section 19 (solicitor-client privilege). In this order, the adjudicator finds all the withheld records are communications that are solicitor-client privileged and are therefore exempt under section 49(a) read with section 19(a). She upholds the university’s decision and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant made a request to the university for access to information about herself. The university issued a decision granting partial access to responsive records. The university denied access to some responsive records based on section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information), read with section 19 (solicitor-client privilege). In this order, the adjudicator finds that the records contain the appellant’s personal information but contain communications that are solicitor-client privileged and are therefore exempt under section 49(a), read with section 19(a). She upholds the university’s decision and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant alleges that the Toronto Police Services Board (the police) failed to conduct a reasonable search for records responsive to his request made under the Act for records relating to him, including all videos pertaining to a specified occurrence report. The adjudicator finds that the police conducted a reasonable search for responsive records within their custody or control. The appeal is dismissed.

The Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks (the ministry) received a request under the Act for access to records provided to or sent from the ministry to the Office of the Mayor of the City of Sault Ste. Marie and to the office of a named M.P.P. at the City of Sault Ste. Marie between 2019 to 2020.

The ministry issued an access decision advising that it had not located responsive records. The appellant appealed this access decision to the IPC on the basis that the ministry did not conduct a reasonable search for responsive records.

In this interim order, the adjudicator determines that the ministry has not provided sufficient evidence to established that it conducted a reasonable search for responsive records. Therefore, she orders the ministry to conduct further searches and to provide affidavit evidence detailing its efforts to search for and locate responsive records.

The Township of Wainfleet received a request under the Act for access to records relating to a septic system inspection at a specified address. The property owner objected to disclosure of the responsive records and the township decided to deny access to the records citing the exemption in section 14(1) (personal privacy). The requester appealed the township’s decision, confirming that she was not interested in any personal information in the records. The township maintained its decision not to release the records.

In this order, the adjudicator finds that the information remaining at issue is not exempt under section 14(1). The adjudicator allows the appeal and orders the township to disclose the records with names and contact information severed.

The Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (the IPC) received a privacy complaint from a children’s aid society about the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) disclosing personal information contrary to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA or the Act). The children’s aid society stated that the OPP had implemented new reporting system software (Child Protection Agency Notification Plug-in) and since that time, had sent several occurrence reports in which a youth was listed a witness or victim of a serious crime, but where there was no indication of a child protection concern. The children’s aid society stated that the OPP should not send reports absent a child protection concern, and that to do so was a breach of the youth’s privacy. The IPC opened a Commissioner-initiated privacy complaint file against the Ministry of the Solicitor General (the ministry), the ministry responsible for the OPP, regarding the use of the reporting system noted above.

In this report, I find that the guidance the ministry provided for use of the Child Protection Agency Notification Plug-in is contrary to section 125 of the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and section 42 of FIPPA. Section 125 of the CYFSA sets out a number of harms or risks to children and imposes a duty to report in cases where an individual, including an OPP officer, has reasonable grounds to suspect one or more of those harms or risks. The guidance provided by the ministry requires officers to send a report to a children’s aid society in all cases where a youth is listed as a victim or witness to a serious crime. Mandating these disclosures, rather than having the officer use their judgment as to whether a duty to report exists under section 125 of the CYFSA, allows for the possibility that the OPP may disclose personal information to a children’s aid society when there is no duty to report, which would be contrary to the Act. I recommend that the ministry change its guidance to reflect that officers are to send reports to a children’s aid society when the officer judges they have a duty to report, and to remove guidance stating that such reports are mandatory when a youth is listed as a victim or a witness.

The requester made a request under the Act to the City of Greater Sudbury (the city) for correspondence regarding her operation of a pet kennel. The city issued a series of decisions, denying access to portions of the responsive records on the basis that they are exempt under the discretionary exemptions in sections 7(1) (advice or recommendations) and 12 (solicitor-client privilege), as well as the mandatory personal privacy exemption in section 14(1). The appellant appealed the city’s decisions and also the fees it charged to provide access to the records.

In this order, the adjudicator upholds the city’s decisions that the information at issue in the records is exempt under sections 7(1), 12, and 14(1). She also upholds the fees charged by the city as reasonable. She dismisses the appeal.

Under the Act, the appellant made a request to the Toronto Police Services Board (the board) for a line-by-line breakdown of the 2020 Toronto Police Service budget for six specified units. He asked that the breakdown be organized by individual program area, function, and service delivered, in accordance with a recommendation of the board chair tabled at an August 2020 public meeting of the board. He also requested any related correspondence between the board and the police service. The board denied the request based on a claim that responsive information is publicly available. The board also asserted that line-by-line budget information is exempt under certain discretionary law enforcement exemptions at section 8 of the Act. After the appellant appealed the board’s decision to the IPC, the board issued a revised decision and disclosed certain budget information in full.

In this interim order, the adjudicator finds that the newly disclosed record containing aggregate budget information does not fully respond to the appellant’s request for a detailed breakdown organized by individual program area, function, and service delivered. She orders the board to issue a decision on access to the requested budget information, and, in the circumstances, that it do so without recourse to a time extension. The adjudicator also dismisses a number of other issues raised by the appellant, including allegations of bias on the part of the police chief. She finds no reasonable basis to order further searches for the requested correspondence between the board and the police service. She remains seized of the appeal to address issues arising from the board’s new access decision.