Decisions

An individual made a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to the police for access to records relating to her sister’s death. The police provided some information but decided not to provide the requester with a suicide note stating it was exempt under the personal privacy exemption in section 14(1) of the Act. The individual appealed stating that the deceased’s parents needed the suicide note for closure in their grieving.

In this order, the adjudicator finds that though the individual provides compassionate reasons for requesting the suicide note, its disclosure is not desirable in this case as it would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy of the deceased’s spouse and other individuals. The adjudicator upholds the police’s decision and dismisses the appeal.

An individual made a request to the Cornwall Police under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) for records from a specified police file. The police file related to a complaint that the individual made relating to events involving her minor daughter. The police provided access to the records requested, but withheld some portions of police officers’ notes, stating that these portions did not contain information responsive to the request.
In this order, the adjudicator upholds the police’s decision to withhold the information marked as non-responsive in the records and finds that the police conducted a reasonable search for responsive records.

A father filed a complaint under the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) regarding a social worker’s decision to deny him access for notes and documents relating to the social worker’s preparation of a custody and access assessment report. The social worker had already provided copies from his file to the complainant’s family lawyer. The social worker takes the position that he was not a “health information custodian” for the purposes of preparing the report. In this decision, the adjudicator finds that the social worker is not a “health information custodian” within the meaning of that term under section 3(1) of PHIPA for the purpose of preparing the report. Accordingly, the adjudicator finds that the complainant does not have a right under PHIPA to request access to the requested records or complain about any fee requested or already paid. The adjudicator exercises her discretion not to conduct a review under sections 57(4)(a) and (b) of PHIPA.

The Town of Saugeen Shores (the town) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act for a receipt for a lease payment made by a specified corporation. The town provided a copy of the receipt to the appellant, but withheld the amount of money paid by the corporation under section 14(1) (personal privacy) of the Act.

The adjudicator finds that the amount of money paid by the corporation to the town is not personal information and that therefore the section 14(1) personal privacy exemption does not apply. He orders the information disclosed.

An individual asked Infrastructure Ontario (IO) for records related to a major Ontario development project. IO located several records, releasing some but not others. The individual appealed the decision to the IPC. During the appeal IO released additional records, but refused to release three records for certain reasons (exemptions) in the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act: sections 17(1) (third party information), 18(1) (economic and other interests), and 19 (solicitor-client privilege).
Following the inquiry, the Ontario government released one of the records (a lease) to the public, and it was no longer at issue in the appeal. The adjudicator finds that one of the two remaining records (an amendment to the lease) should not be disclosed because of section 19, but orders that IO disclose the other one (a draft report).

At issue in this appeal is whether the appellant’s requests to Metrolinx for access to information are frivolous or vexatious under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). In this order the adjudicator finds that Metrolinx has not established that the appellant’s requests are frivolous or vexatious within the meaning of section 10(1)(b) of the Act. The adjudicator does not uphold Metrolinx’s denial of access on the basis of section 10(1)(b) of the Act and orders Metrolinx to issue access decisions in relation to all the appeals without the ability to claim the requests are frivolous or vexatious.

An individual asked the ministry for a copy of a report relating to a carbon monoxide leak at her place of employment. The ministry granted the individual partial access to the requested records claiming that some portions were not responsive to the request and that disclosure of other portions would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 21(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. The appellant appealed the ministry’s decision and also claimed that additional records should exist. The adjudicator upholds the ministry’s decision to withhold portions of the records and finds that it conducted a reasonable search.

This order resolves two appeals regarding access to records related to certain baseball associations and the Town of Grimsby (the town), under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). The town issued a fee estimate to the requester, to process the request. The town decided to partially disclose some information without citing any sections of the Act. A party whose interests could be affected by disclosure (the affected party) appealed the town’s decision to disclose some emails (or parts of emails) involving that party. The requester also appealed the town’s decision, seeking access to the information withheld, and disputing the town’s fee estimate, its decision not to waive the fee, and the reasonableness of its search.
In this order, the adjudicator allows the affected party’s appeal and orders the town to withhold the three emails remaining at issue, in full, because the emails contain personal information that cannot be disclosed (under the discretionary personal privacy exemption at section 38(b) of the Act).
The adjudicator also allows the requester’s appeal, in part. She finds that all personal information in the records cannot be disclosed (under section 38(b) or the mandatory personal privacy exemption at section 14(1), whichever applies). However, the adjudicator does not agree that the information in three records cannot be disclosed on the basis of the exemption for third party information [section 10(1)] and orders the town to disclose those records to the requester. The adjudicator does not uphold the town’s fee (and only allows $10 of it) but upholds the town’s decision not to waive the fee. The adjudicator also upholds the town’s search for responsive records as reasonable.

Under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, an individual asked the city for information relating to a phase I and phase II environmental site assessment. The city located and provided some records but withheld two environmental site assessments claiming that they contained third party information that is exempt from disclosure because of section 10(1) of the Act. The requester appealed the city’s decision. At adjudication, one of the affected parties claimed that the city did not have custody or control of the assessments.

In this order, the adjudicator concludes that the assessments are within the custody or under the control of the city. He also finds that the records are not exempt from disclosure by section 10(1) and orders the city to provide the assessments to the requester.

The appellant made a request to the ministry for access to records about himself. The ministry determined that portions of four responsive records were not responsive to the request because they are not about the appellant. The appellant seeks access to the withheld information, challenges the reasonableness of the ministry’s search for responsive records, and claims the ministry acted in a conflict of interest. The adjudicator finds that the information at issue is not responsive to the request and upholds the ministry’s search as reasonable. She finds that the appellant’s conflict of interest claim is not substantiated and dismisses the appeal.

A public hospital reported a privacy breach under PHIPA to the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC). The breach involved a radiologist with privileges at the hospital who accessed patients’ health records without authorization. The affected patients included the radiologist’s sister-in-law, who brought the privacy breach to the attention of the hospital, as well as members of her family.
As an agent of the hospital, the radiologist’s actions were an inappropriate use of personal health information by the hospital contrary to section 29 of PHIPA which sets out limits on and requirements for the use of this information.
In response, the hospital took steps to investigate, contain and remediate the breach. The hospital also provided the appropriate notification in the circumstances, disciplined the radiologist and reported him to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.
Despite this, the IPC had concerns about the hospital’s ability to detect and deter unauthorized access to patients’ health records in relation to its EHR systems. These systems were not built from a privacy audit perspective and the hospital only became aware of the breach because of a privacy complaint made by the radiologist’s sister-in-law to another regional hospital about him.
At the time of the breach, the hospital’s EHR systems had inherent limitations and, generally, did not display a privacy notice or warning flag. For these reasons, the investigator finds that the hospital did not take steps that are reasonable in the circumstances for the security of personal health information against unauthorized use as required by section 12 of PHIPA. However, given the hospital’s response to the breach and implementation of privacy warning flags in its EHR systems, the investigator finds that a formal review of this matter under Part VI of PHIPA is not warranted.

This second interim order follows Interim Order MO-4488-I, in which the IPC ordered the respondent board to issue a new access decision in response to a request for a line-by-line breakdown of the 2020 Toronto Police Service budget for six specified police units and services, organized by individual program area, function, and service delivered. In the first interim order, the adjudicator found that the board’s disclosures to that point did not fully respond to the appellant’s request for a detailed budget breakdown, including specified components. She also found that the board had failed to clearly articulate or substantiate a claim that responsive budget information does not exist, or otherwise cannot be produced for the purposes of access under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act).
In this second interim order, the adjudicator considers the board’s evidence in support of its revised decision that responsive budget information “never existed and it is not possible to produce this information.” She finds that the board has again failed to substantiate a claim that responsive budget information either does not exist, or exists but cannot be produced for the purposes of the Act. She orders the board to conduct another search for responsive information in its custody or control. If, following this search, the board concludes that responsive information does not exist anywhere in its record holdings, or cannot be produced in the form of a “record” for the purposes of the Act, the board must provide a detailed explanation of how it reached this conclusion. The adjudicator remains seized of the appeal to address issues arising from this second interim order.

An individual sought access under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to records relating to his residence. The city granted partial access to some records and denied access in full to emails and attachments on the basis that disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of another individual’s personal privacy (section 38(b)). In this order, the adjudicator finds that the information in the emails and attachments is exempt under section 38(b). She upholds the city’s decision and dismisses the appeal.

In response to further searches ordered by the IPC, the university located responsive records but claimed that most of them could not be disclosed under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because of the employment and labour relations exclusion at section 65(6). In this order, the adjudicator upholds the university’s claim and dismisses the appeal.

A journalist requested copies of serious occurrence reports provided to the ministry by a particular Indigenous children’s aid service provider for a specified 10-month period. The ministry refused to provide the journalist with copies of these reports, stating that providing the records would infringe the privacy rights of the individuals in the reports [the reason (exemption) at section 21(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA)]. The journalist did not seek the names of the children in care but information about each occurrence and how it was handled. The ministry maintained that disclosure of the information sought was not permitted for the personal privacy reason stated in FIPPA.

In this order, the adjudicator finds that some of the records are not able to be accessed under FIPPA due to the Youth Criminal Justice Act. Regarding the remaining information, the adjudicator agrees with the ministry and dismisses the appeal. The adjudicator also addresses the ministry’s claim made during the inquiry that some of the records could not be disclosed due to a confidentiality provision in the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, 2017.