Decisions

A union asked Fanshawe for a contract between it and a language academy. Fanshawe decided that the whole contract could be provided to the individual. The language academy opposed disclosure of parts of the contract to the individual because it consists of information supplied in confidence to Fanshawe that would cause certain harms (the section 17(1)) if disclosed. The adjudicator finds that these parts of the contract must be disclosed under the Act.

An individual asked the ministry for information about searches made on the Ontario Provincial Police database. The ministry initially refused access to a spreadsheet of responsive information. During the appeal, the ministry revised its position and decided to provide partial access to the spreadsheet. It did not disclose portions of the spreadsheet claiming that disclosure of that information would be an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of another individual (section 49(b)).

In this order, the adjudicator finds some of the information that was not disclosed is not responsive to the request. She finds the other information that the ministry decided not to disclose is exempt under section 49(b) and upholds the ministry’s decision. She dismisses the appeal.

The Hospital for Sick Children received a 19-part request under the Act for access to a variety of records including invoices, records of payments, emails, communications, and donations made for various specified time periods including prior to 2007. The hospital disclosed some information but denied access to entire records on the basis that they were exempt from the Act by section 19 (solicitor-client privilege). It also stated that because of section 69(2) of the Act, it was not required to search for records that pre-date January 1, 2007. The appellant appealed the hospital’s decision and also claimed that section 69(2) is unconstitutional. In this appeal, the adjudicator upholds the hospital’s reliance on section 19 and dismisses the appellant’s claim that section 69(2) is unconstitutional.

This interim order arises from two issues raised by an affected party during an inquiry into an appeal of Cabinet Office’s decision to deny a request made under the Act. The request was for the call log of the personal cell phone number of an identified individual for a specific time period. Cabinet Office denied access to the records claiming they are not under its custody or control. The appellant appealed Cabinet Office’s decision. During the inquiry, the adjudicator notified an affected party and invited them to make submissions on the issues under appeal. In their representations and further correspondence, the affected party raised two additional issues: whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the adjudicator, and whether limitations should be placed on the appellant’s use of the affected party’s representations. In this interim order, the adjudicator finds there is no reasonable apprehension of bias and does not place restrictions on the appellant’s use of the affected party’s redacted representations.

This interim order arises from two issues raised by an affected party during an inquiry into an appeal of Cabinet Office’s decision to deny a request made under the Act. The request was for the call log of the personal cell phone number of an identified individual for a specific time period. Cabinet Office denied access to the records claiming they are not under its custody or control. The appellant appealed Cabinet Office’s decision. During the inquiry, the adjudicator notified an affected party and invited them to make submissions on the issues under appeal. In their representations and further correspondence, the affected party raised two additional issues: whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the adjudicator, and whether limitations should be placed on the appellant’s use of the affected party’s representations. In this interim order, the adjudicator finds there is no reasonable apprehension of bias and does not place restrictions on the appellant’s use of the affected party’s redacted representations.

An individual sought access under the Act to a water drainage map for his neighbourhood in the City of Burlington (the city). The city denied access to the drainage map saying that if it was to disclose the map it could endanger a system (section 8(1)(i)) or threaten the health or safety of individuals (section 13). In this order, the adjudicator finds that the city has not established that disclosure could endanger a system or threaten the health or safety of any individuals. She orders the city to disclose the drainage map to the individual.

An individual requested, under the Act, records relating to a fire inspection complaint made about her property. The city disclosed some information in the records but withheld other information saying that it was not responsive to the request. The individual appealed the city’s access decision because she believes that the non-responsive information had some connection to her property. In this order, the adjudicator upholds the city’s decision not to disclose the remaining information finding that it is not responsive to the request.

An individual requested fire inspection records about a particular fire. The ministry provided some of these records, but denied access to others. The ministry said that it did so to protect other people’s personal privacy (section 21(1) of the Act).

The adjudicator did not agree that the parts of records that the individual wanted contained other people’s personal information. She ordered the ministry to disclose the withheld information to the individual.

The William Osler Health System – Peel Memorial Centre (the hospital) received a request under the Act for access to contracts, agreements, or fees paid to a named company. The hospital denied access to the responsive records under section 19 (solicitor-client privilege) of the Act. In this order, the adjudicator partially upholds the hospital’s decision and orders the hospital to disclose additional information to the appellant.

The complainant made a request under the Act for access to her and her child’s charts. The custodian charged the complainant $30 for each chart. The complainant’s request to the custodian to waive the fees was denied. As a result, the complainant filed a complaint under the Act with respect to the amount of the fee and the custodian’s decision not to waive the fee.
In this decision, the adjudicator finds that $30 constitutes “reasonable cost recovery” for each chart. The adjudicator upholds the custodian’s exercise of discretion not to waive the fee..

The municipality received a request under the Act for records relating to its mandatory vaccination policy. This appeal deals with part 3 of the request for access to meeting dates and documents of closed door meetings of its Council that discussed the mandatory vaccination policy. Ultimately, the municipality claimed the responsive record was excluded from the Act by section 52(3)3 (labour relations and employment-related information) and, in the alternative, it claimed the record was exempt by section 6(1)(b) (closed meeting). At mediation, the appellant also raised the issue of scope and the municipality’s search for responsive records. In this order, the adjudicator finds that the record is not excluded from the Act by section 52(3)3 but finds that the exemption at section 6(1)(b) applies to the information. He also finds that the municipality’s search for responsive records was reasonable and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant asked the City of Ottawa for information about amendments to a by-law. The city granted access to some information. The appellant asked for more information at mediation that the city says went beyond the scope of the original request. The adjudicator finds that the new details are outside the scope of the original request and that the city was not required to search for additional records based on the new information. She dismisses the appeal.

Toronto Metropolitan University (which was previously called Ryerson University) received a request under the Act for briefs or communications made to it during a public engagement period relating to Egerton Ryerson. After the appellant received disclosure of the responsive emails (without identifying details), she raised the issue of reasonable search. In this order, the adjudicator upholds the reasonableness of the university’s search and dismisses the appeal.

An individual made two requests to the ministry. One request was for access to a named company’s application to receive funding from the ministry’s Skills Development Fund (SDF) to operate a training program for Home Support Workers and the other request was for a related agreement between the named company and the ministry. The ministry issued a decision on each request granting access, in part, to the SDF application and the agreement, relying on section 17(1) (third party information) to withhold some information. The named company appealed the decision on the basis that section 17(1) applies to the information the ministry is prepared to disclose. In this order, the adjudicator finds that the information remaining at issue is not exempt under section 17(1). She orders the ministry to disclose the information in accordance with its revised decisions and dismisses the appeal.

The appellant was the victim of fraud, losing a large amount of money when he transferred Bitcoin to another individual under false pretences. The police conducted an investigation but did not have enough information to proceed with criminal charges. The appellant received an occurrence report under the Act with an individual’s information withheld under section 14(1) (personal privacy). He appealed the police’s access decision, stating that he required this information to recover the lost money.
In this order, the adjudicator finds that the information is exempt from disclosure under section 38(b) (personal privacy, with the report containing the appellant’s personal information). He finds that the extent, if any, of the individual’s involvement in the crime is not known, favouring withholding the information. Additionally, he finds that the appellant has not adequately explained how the information at issue would assist with recovering the lost money. He upholds the police’s decision.