Latest IPC Decisions

The Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery (the ministry) received a request under the Act for access to records relating to a named company’s application to become a licensed consumer reporting agency. The ministry decided to disclose the records, in part. The named company appealed the ministry’s decision In this order, the adjudicator finds that some information that the ministry decided to disclose qualifies as personal information. As the requester does not seek access to personal information, she orders the ministry not to disclose it to the requester. She also finds that section 17(1) (third party information) does not apply. As a result, the adjudicator partially upholds the ministry’s decision.

The appellant requested correction of his personal information – the removal of his name from an occurrence details report about an incident involving him. The police denied the correction request because it did not meet the requirements for the police to grant it; the appellant’s name had to remain in the report because he was the individual who had contacted the police. The police advised the appellant that he could require that a statement of disagreement be attached to the report in accordance with section 36(2)(b) of the Act.

The adjudicator exercises her discretion under section 41(1) of the Act not to conduct an inquiry to review the police’s decision because an inquiry is not warranted. The police have responded adequately to the correction request, and they are not required to grant it. The appeal is dismissed.

The ministry of the Attorney General (the ministry) requested reconsideration of Order PO-4491 on the basis that there was an accidental error in relation to one record ordered to be disclosed. In this reconsideration order, the adjudicator finds that an accidental error occurred and that there are sufficient grounds to reconsider Order PO-4491 in accordance with the IPC’s Code of Procedure. After reconsidering the order, the adjudicator finds that the discretionary exemption at section 14(1)(j) (law enforcement) applies to the record, and she upholds the ministry’s exercise of discretion to withhold it.

The appellant requested a reconsideration of Order MO-4478-F. In that order, the adjudicator found that the police’s search, following Interim Order 4266-I, was reasonable and dismissed the appeal.
In his reconsideration request, the appellant claimed fundamental defects in the adjudication process, a lack of procedural fairness, jurisdictional defects, serious errors and omissions, and reasonable grounds to presume bias. In this reconsideration order, the adjudicator finds that the appellant has not established any of the grounds for reconsideration in section 18.01 of the IPC’s Code of Procedure and denies the reconsideration request. He also finds that the appellant has not established bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant made a request under the Act for records relating to a complaint he filed regarding a surveillance camera in his neighbourhood. The city withheld some records, claiming the discretionary exemptions in section 38(a) (records containing the requester’s own personal information), read with sections 7(1) (advice or recommendations) and 12 (solicitor-client privilege), and section 38(b) (unjustified invasion of personal privacy). In this order, the adjudicator upholds the city’s decision and finds there is no public interest in the disclosure of the records. The adjudicator dismisses the appeal.

The Toronto Police Services Board (the police) received a request under the Act for access to records related to a specific incident on a Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) streetcar. The police granted partial access to the responsive records, withholding information under the discretionary personal privacy exemption at section 38(b) of the Act. The appellant appealed the police’s decision to the IPC and raised reasonable search as an issue. In this order, the adjudicator finds the police conducted a reasonable search, and partially upholds the police’s decision to withhold some of the information. However, she orders the police to disclose additional information to the appellant.

The appellant sought access to OPP records regarding her husband’s death in a motor vehicle collision. The ministry disclosed several records to the appellant because to do so would be desirable for compassionate reasons as set out in section 21(4)(d) of the Act. The appellant sought access to additional information. In this order, the adjudicator finds that an audio recording of a witness statement should be disclosed to the appellant because to do so would be desirable for compassionate reasons. The adjudicator upholds the remainder of the ministry’s decision.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (the IPC) received an anonymous complaint from a group of doctors relating to two research databases created from personal health information, UTOPIAN and POPLAR. The complaint alleged that the personal health information used to populate these databases was obtained from health information custodians without patient consent, and without providing sufficient information to the custodians. The complaint raised concerns about the de-identification of personal health information, and the possibility that such information was being sold or otherwise provided to third parties. The complainants contended that the underlying activity of operating a database of the nature of UTOPIAN and POPLAR was not “research” as contemplated by section 44 of the Personal Health Information Protection Act (the Act or PHIPA), and further alleged that even if this was research, the databases did not otherwise meet the requirements of section 44.
The IPC contacted the University of Toronto (the University), the operator of UTOPIAN. The University stated that POPLAR had been taken over by Queen’s University and was not yet operational, which Queen’s independently confirmed to the IPC. Accordingly, this investigation in respect of the University focuses on UTOPIAN only.
The University provided the IPC with extensive documentation regarding the operation of UTOPIAN. During the course of the investigation, the University stated that it continued to operate its database pursuant to a Protocol Completion Report approved by the University of Toronto Research Ethics Board (REB) after the REB approval for its research plan had expired. Later in this investigation, the University reported that it had paused all UTOPIAN activities and was in the process of applying for REB approval for use of the archived UTOPIAN database for research purposes.
In this decision, I find that the University collected personal health information without authorization under the Act during two periods when its REB approval had lapsed. I also find that the University failed to comply with requirements in s. 44 of the Act in that it failed to provide health information custodians copies of the research plan and its approval decision, failed to make regular site visits as required under the applicable research plan, and failed to provide custodians with notice of the 2018 collections of personal health information that occurred without an REB approval in place. Finally, I find that the University did not amend its research agreements by merely sending custodians notice of its proposed changes, and to the extent that the University collected, used, and retained personal health information beyond what was permitted by the applicable research agreement, this collection, use, and retention contravened section 44 of the Act.
The IPC did not find any evidence to substantiate the complainants’ allegations regarding the sale of personal health information, or their de-identification concerns. However, I recommend that in its new application to the REB relating to UTOPIAN data, the University should update its means of notifying patients regarding the UTOPIAN project, conduct a re-identification study to assess the robustness of its de-identification procedures, and exercise greater transparency with contributing custodians. I also recommend that the University ensure that it has research agreements in place with contributing custodians, including any significant amendments hereto, and that it complies with the applicable research agreements.

The appellant made a request to the municipality under the Act for records related to the former mayor and former Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The municipality located and granted partial access to responsive records, but withheld a letter sent to the CAO under section 14(1) (personal privacy). The appellant sought access to the letter and raised the application of the section 16 public interest override.
In this order, the adjudicator finds that the termination letter is excluded from the scope of the Act under section 52(3). He dismisses the appeal.

The University of Toronto (the university) received two requests under the Act for records related to the appellant’s interactions with the university and its staff.

The university denied access to the records in full, claiming the exclusion at section 65(6)3 (employment or labour relations) applies to an internal investigative report about an employee and emails about the report and the exemption at section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information), read with section 20 (threat to safety or health), applies to the remaining records, which are emails and reports.

In this order, the adjudicator upholds the university’s decision that the investigative report and emails about the report are excluded from the scope of the Act by reason of section 65(6)3. She also upholds the university’s decision that the remaining records are exempt by reason of section 49(a), read with section 20.

The complainant sought access to her records of personal health information from Dr. Eric Ireland (the custodian). This decision determines that the custodian is deemed to have refused the complainant’s request for access. The custodian is ordered to provide a response to the complainant in response to her request for access to records of her personal health information in accordance with the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The appellant requested a reconsideration of the adjudicator’s decision in Order
MO-4199 to uphold, in part, the reasonableness of a search conducted by the Regional
Municipality of Durham (the region) for records about environmental testing at a waste
management facility.
In this decision, the adjudicator finds that the appellant has not established any of the grounds
for reconsideration in section 18.01 of the IPC’s Code of Procedure

The appellant submitted a request under the Act to the town for emails relating to a recreational facility. The town withheld the emails of councillors on the basis that it does not have custody or control of them under section 4(1). The adjudicator finds that three emails are within the town’s custody and control and orders the town to issue an access decision related to these emails. The adjudicator upholds the town’s decision that the remaining emails withheld under section 4(1) are not in its custody or control.

The town also located other emails exchanged between staff and residents. The town granted the appellant partial disclosure to these emails claiming that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 14(1). The adjudicator also finds that the personal privacy provision applies to the majority of the emails and upholds the town’s decision to not to disclose them to the appellant under section 14(1). The adjudicator reserves her finding on the application of section 14(1) to three emails, pending notification of the individuals who might be affected by their disclosure.

On May 25, 2023, the requester submitted a request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the Ministry of the Solicitor General (the ministry) for access to general records. The requester appealed to this office on the basis that the ministry failed to provide an access decision within the prescribed time limit under the Act. This order finds the ministry to be in a deemed refusal situation pursuant to section 29(4) of the Act. The ministry is ordered to issue a final decision regarding access by May 9, 2024, without any recourse to a time extension.

The appellant sought access to all university records during a specific period regarding his appointment to a position with an external organization while he was a professor at the university. The university located responsive records and granted the appellant access to most of them. To withhold some records and information, the university relied on the discretionary exemption in section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information), read with section 13(1) (advice or recommendations). It also withheld information that was not responsive to the request.
The appellant challenged the university’s decision and asserted that the withheld information should be ordered disclosed under section 23 because disclosure is in the public interest.
In this order, the adjudicator upholds the university’s decision that the information it withheld under section 49(a) read with section 13(1) is exempt from disclosure. She also concludes that the public interest override does not apply because the withheld information does not relate to the geopolitical issue the appellant cites; rather, the withheld information relates to a university resources allocation matter.