Decisions

On December 5, 1996, Brett James, communications special assistant to Jim Wilson, Minister of Health, telephoned Jane Coutts, reporter for The Globe and Mail, to discuss a news conference scheduled for that morning by the Specialist Coalition of Ontario. At the time, physicians in the province were in negotiations with the Ministry on a number of financial issues. The Specialist Coalition is an organization representing specialist physicians; the Vice-Chair of the Coalition is Dr. William Hughes.

After leaving a message for Coutts to return his call, James watched the news conference attended by both Hughes and Coutts. Coutts later returned James’ call, leaving a message for him. Around noon on December 5, James telephoned and spoke with Coutts. During the course of their conversation about the news conference and the questions Coutts had asked Hughes, James allegedly told Coutts that Hughes was the “‘No. 1’ biller” to the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP).

On December 6, 1996, Coutts telephoned James and informed him that she intended to write about his comments of the previous day concerning Hughes. Later that day, James resigned from his position in the Minister’s Office.

In The Globe and Mail on December 7, 1996, Coutts wrote that James had told her that Hughes, a Peterborough cardiologist, “was Ontario’s ‘No. 1’ biller, charging more to OHIP than any other doctor in the province.”

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This investigation was initiated as a result of a complaint concerning the Ministry of Housing (the Ministry).

The complainant, an employee of the Ministry, was advised in a meeting with the director of the branch (the Director) and the manager of the section where she was employed, that she was being suspended for 20 days pending an investigation. According to the complainant, once she had left the office, the Director called a branch meeting, with the manager, and disclosed to the branch staff that she had been suspended.

The complainant was concerned that this disclosure of her personal information was not in compliance with the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act).

Issues Arising from the Investigation

The following issues were identified as arising from the investigation:

(A) Was the information in question "personal information", as defined in section 2(1) of the Act? If yes,

(B) Was the disclosure of the complainant's personal information to her co-workers in compliance with section 42 of the Act?

INTRODUCTION Background of the Complaint This investigation was initiated as a result of a complaint concerning a municipal town (the Town). The complainant was suspended from his position as the Town's chief of police. During his suspension, the complainant applied for employment with a city (the City). When making this application to the City, the complainant did not provide anyone from the Town as a reference, and the Town was not aware that he had made such an application. However, according to the complainant, the City contacted the Town and the Town disclosed his salary and the fact that he had been suspended as chief of police. The complainant was concerned that the Town's disclosure of his salary and suspension to the City, without his consent, was contrary to the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ). Issues Arising from the Investigation The following issues were identified as arising from the investigation: (A) Was the information in question "personal information", as defined in section 2(1) of the Act ? If yes, (B) Was the specific personal information disclosed by the Town? (C) Did section 27 of the Act apply to the complainant's personal information that he had been suspended? (D) Was the complainant's personal information that he had been suspended disclosed in compliance with section 32 of the Act ? RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION Issue A: Was the information in question "personal information", as defined in section 2(1) of the Act ? Section 2(1) of the Act states that personal information "means recorded information about an identifiable individual". The information in question was the complainant's salary and the fact that he had been suspended as chief of police by the Town. While the complainant's name was not specifically mentioned in the telephone conversation between the Town and the City, he was referred to as the "chief of police" and was, therefore, an identifiable individual. It is our view that the information in question met the requirements of the definition of personal information in section 2(1) of the Act . Conclusion: The information in question was personal information as defined in section 2(1) of the Act . Issue B: Was the specific personal information disclosed by the Town? The complainant stated that his actual salary and the fact that he was suspended had been disclosed by the Town. Both the City and the Town agreed that the Town had disclosed the fact that the complainant had been suspended. The Town had advised the City that "no negotiation had been undertaken recently due to the current Chief's suspension". However, with respect to the complainant's salary information, the Town stated that, when the City requested information regarding the salary "Classes" for the chief of police, the Town advised the City that it did not understand the request for "Classes", and that "the Chief's salary was in a specified range and that there were four classes of constables included in the range of salaries quoted...from mid-forty to mid fifty-five thousand range." The Town maintained that it did not tell the City "specific dollar amounts", nor did it refer to the complainant or to his salary directly; "at no time was [the complainant's] name or salary mentioned during the conversation in question." The City advised us that the Town stated that the Town did not have ranges of salaries. The City said that it was not given a salary range nor was it given the complainant's actual salary. Both the City and the Town agreed that the complainant's actual salary had not been disclosed. However, based upon the conflicting information provided to us by the Town and the City, we are unable to determine whether the complainant's salary range was disclosed by the Town. Conclusion: The complainant's suspension was disclosed by the Town. The complainant's actual salary was not disclosed by the Town. Issue C: Did section 27 of the Act apply to the complainant's personal information that he had been suspended? The Town stated that the fact that the complainant was suspended as chief of police was public knowledge. It stated that a resolution regarding the suspension was passed at an open meeting of the Police Services Board for the Town and that the local newspapers had published articles related to the suspension. Therefore, we have examined whether section 27 of the Act was applicable to the personal information disclosed in this case. Section 27 of the Act states that: This Part does not apply to personal information that is maintained for the purpose of creating a record that is available to the general public. The Town provided a copy of minutes from a meeting of the Town's Police Services Board. These minutes included the resolution that the complainant's suspension be continued indefinitely at the discretion of the Police Services Board. The Town stated that the resolution was made at an open public meeting. Section 27 states that the privacy provisions of the Act do not apply to personal information that is maintained for the purpose of creating a record that is available to the general public . While the general public may have been aware that the complainant had been suspended as chief of police, and, while that information appeared in the Police Services Board's minutes and was raised at a public meeting, the fact that the complainant had been suspended was not information that the Town was specifically maintaining "for the purpose of creating a record available to the general public". Accordingly, we do not consider this information to have been "public" within the meaning of section 27 of the Act . In our view, section 27 of the Act did not apply in the circumstances of this case. Conclusion: Section 27 of the Act was not applicable. Issue D: Was the complainant's personal information that he had been suspended disclosed