ONTARIO COURT (GENERAL DIVISION)
Lane J.
JANE DOE
and
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF POLICE FOR THE
MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO
ENDORSEMENT
The order which I made on October 18, 1996 herein was not
intended to interfere in any way with the operation of the Municipal Freedom
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act legislation, nor to ban the
publication of the contents of police files required to be produced under that
Act. My order was directed toward the preservation of the integrity of the
discovery process by prohibiting publication of information obtained by one
party from the other under the compulsions of that discovery process, including
publication by third parties of such information. In my view, there is no
inherent conflict between the Act and the provisions of the Rules [of
Civil Procedure] as to maintaining confidentiality of disclosures made during
discovery. The Act contains certain exemptions relating to litigation.
It may be that much information given on discovery (and thus confidential in
that process) would nevertheless be available to anyone applying under the
Act; if so, then so be it; the Rules of Civil Procedure do not purport
to bar publication or use of information obtained otherwise than on discovery,
even though the two classes of information may overlap, or even be precisely
the same.
Although that seems to me to be the effect of the order as it
presently reads, it is desirable to clarify by adding at the end of the
sentence: "this order does not restrict the jurisdiction of the Information and
Privacy Commissioner/Ontario under the Municipal Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56 to direct the production of
documents or information even though such documents or information may have
been the subject of discovery in this action."
I was asked to add language relating to the "use" of information
obtained on discovery as a clue or pointer for the applicant's request under
the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. This
would involve a retroactive imposition of an arguably more stringent provision
upon anyone having notice of this order. As well there is no evidence before me
that any such thing has or may occur; if such evidence comes to light the
situation appears to be covered by the Rules [of Civil Procedure].
I decline therefore to add the reference to "otherwise use" to
the existing order.
No costs.
June 3, 1997 |
"D. Lane J." |
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